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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ROBERT B. HANSEN 
No. 15605 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
BRIEF OF UTAH STATE BAR CCMMISSION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in a formal complaint before the 
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar in four counts 
with multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct of the Utah State Bar, relating to legal work done by 
him as an attorney and counselor of the Utah State Bar. 
DISPffiITION OF THE 
BCf.l.RD OF CCMMISSIONERS 
After a two-day trial, the Hearing Officers entered 
findings and decision that Appellant had violated specific 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar relating 
to three of the counts; found no violations as to the· fourth; 
and recommended to the Board of Commissioners that Appellant 
be suspended for one year. The Board of Commissioners approved 
and adopted the findings and recommended to this court that 
Appellant be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 
THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The order of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
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Bar adopting the findings of the Hearing Examiners should be 
affirmed and its recommendation that Appellant be suspended 
from the practice of law for a period of one year should be 
adopted. 
STATEMENT OF FACT AND ARGUMENT 
Three of the counts, the Dick, Emarine and Lowry matters, 
related to activities of Appellant in the private practice of 
law. Much of the alleged misconduct as to these counts pre-
ceded the time when Appellant became Attorney General for the 
State of Utah. The Piepenburg matter related to activity of 
Appellant while he was Deputy Attorney General and associated 
as counsel for the prosecution in the trial of that case. T~ 
charges as to the Dick matter were dismissed. Nevertheless, 
Appellant devotes much space in his brief on it. We will corrr 
only briefly. 
Appellant complains that the Commission did not consider 
matters in mitigation. We submit that this is not so. CoMU 
ing the multiple violations of the Rules, it is apparent the 
Commission considered mitigating circumstances in arriving at 
recommendation for a one-year suspension. 
It is the posit ion of the Bar that the findings are supp:· 
by the evidence. The findings are clear and concise and meet· 
allegations of the complaint. They accurately and fairly refi 
the evidence. It is noted that some of the findings are fav:.: 
to Appellant. Appellant has not demonstrated that the cornmb' 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that the findings are ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND REC~NDATION OF THE BAR 
CCMMISSION SHCULD BE ADOPTED UNLESS THE CCURT 
IS PERSUADED THAT THE CCMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY, 
CAPRICICUSLY, OR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS PCl'1ERS. 
This Court has consistently ruled that the findings and 
recommendation of the Bar Commission in disciplinary matters 
are to be accorded the "presumption of correctness and 
propriety." In re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (Ut. 1974). 
They should not be overturned unless the Court is persuaded 
"that the Commission has acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or 
teyond the scope of its powers," Id.; In re Wad~, 497 P.2d 22 
(Ut. 1972), or unless the findings and recommendation are 
"plainly in error," In re Badger, 493 P.2d 1273 (Ut. 1972) 
modified on reh" 501 P.2d 106 (1952), or "not in accord with 
the preponderance of the evidence." In re Bridwell, 474 P.2d 
116 (Ut. 1970). 
While it is true, as set forth in Appellant's Brief, that 
the three-justice majority in Bridwell, supra, stated that the 
recommendation of the Bar Commission is entitled to less weight 
on review than the findings, subsequent decisions of this 
Court have treated the findings and recommendation with equal 
respect. In re Johnston, supra; In re Badger, supra; See In 
re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (Ut. 1960). In Badger, the 
Court stated: 
The Bar commission has recommended that 
Mr. Badger's conduct justifies disbarment; 
such a recommendation, in the final analysis 
constitutes a value judgment, which may be 
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accepted, modified, or rejected by this 
court. However, this court has established 
a standard that it will sustain the recom-
mendation of the Bar Commission unless it 
has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unreasonably. 493 P.2d at 1275. 
The reasons for the respect accorded the findings 
and recommendation of the Bar Commission are obvious. With~ 
the presumption of correctness and propriety, this Court 
would be placed in the position of considering de novo 
every disciplinary action brought in the State. 
The same rationale applies to the findings of 
fact made by the hearing panel of three commissioners. 
As hearing officers they are the finders of fact and their 
findings are entitled to the same presumption of correct-
ness by the Bar Commission. 
In MacFarlane, supra, this Court noted that the 
Bar Commission is uniquely qualified to fulfill this role, 
stating: 
On this problem it is relevant to 
observe that the propriety of the ques-
tioned conduct must necessarily be directed 
to the good conscience and ethical and 
moral standards of members of the Bar, 
and that the Bar Commissioners as its 
elected representatives are peculiarly 
suited to be the arbiters of such 
standards. They are vitally concerned 
with the general conduct of the Bar and 
its public relations and are also 
seriously concerned with a charge against 
a fellow member such as that involved in 
the instant proceeding. 350 P.2d at 633. 
This Court has also refused to review the mental 
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process by which the Bar Commission reached its conclusions. 
In re MacFarlane, supra. Implicit in that holding is 
recognition that the hearing officers are uniquely qualified 
to decide upon the credibility of witness, the relative 
weight to be given competing evidence, and the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom. A mere reading of the "cold" 
record could not provide those insights. 
For that reason, the only correct and workable 
approach is as stated by then Chief Justice Crockett in 
dissent in In re Bridwell, supra: 
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that 
for the same reasons that presumptions 
of verity are indulged in favor of those 
judgments and orders, some deference should 
be indulged to the findings and recom-
mendations of the Bar Disciplinary 
Committee and the State Bar Commission; 
and that accordingly, we should assume 
that they believed those aspects of the 
evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, that support 
their findings and recommendations; and 
that we therefore should survey the 
evidence in that light, and sustain their 
findings and recommendations unless it 
appears that they have acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily or unreasonably. 474 P.2d at 
117. 
Before turning to the separate counts, it should 
be noted that Appellant's basic line of attack is to 
storm the findings of the commission head-on and attempt 
to re-argue the evidence before this Court. However, 
nowhere does Appellant attempt to show that the Bar Commis-
sion acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Beyond that, 
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Appellant must show that the findings are plainly in error 
or not in accordance with the preponderance of evidence, 1·1he:r. 
that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
findings of the Bar Commission. This Appellant has clearly 
failed to do. 
POINT II. COONT FOOR: THE DICK MATTER. THE CQ.1MISSION HAD 
AUTHORITY TO "EXONERATE" APPELLANT AND THIS CCURT: 
WITHOOT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DISMISSAL OF TH: 
COONT. THE DISMISSAL SHCULD Nor BE MODIFIED. 
Counsel for The Bar Commission are at a loss to under-
stand Appellant's attack on the Commission's decision on 
Count Four and its pre-eminent posit ion in Appellant's Brief. 
Although Appellant prevailed below, that the Bar Commission 
ruled that his conduct did not constitute a violation of t~ 
Rules of Professional Conduct, he apparently seeks further 
exoneration by attempting to re-argue the entire matter bef~ 
this Court. 
According to the Revised Rules of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar (1971), the Bar Commission is empowered 
to enter an Order dismissing the complaint or to make a 
recommendation for discipline to the Supreme court. Rule 
III(7). Nowhere is the Commission given the power to 
"exonerate" a subject attorney. The finding that the 
attorney did not violate the Rules of Professional Con-
duct and the dismissal of the charge is, in effect, an 
exoneration of the attorney. 
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Moreover, a dismissal by the Bar Commission is 
conclusive as to all parties. The Utah State Bar is not 
entitled to appeal an adverse ruling by the Commission. 
See Rule IV, Revised Rules of Discipline. Therefore, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Order of 
the Commission with respect to Count Four. 
But assuming, arquendo, that the Court were to 
undertake a review of this count, there has been no showing 
of arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the 
Commission nor has there been an adequate showing that the 
findings go against the preponderance of evidence. The 
decision of the Commission should be upheld and not modi-
fied. The findings accurately reflect the evidence, even 
in their so-called "negative" aspects. Appellant is 
entitled only to his finding of no violation and the 
dismissal of the particular charge. 
POINT III. COONT THREE. THE PIEPENBURG MATTER. THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS. EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED. APPELLANT MAY Nor SHIFT HIS 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANorHER. 
After hearing extensive evidence with respect to 
count Three the commission found that Appellant made 
certain statements to a member of the press which a 
reasonable person would have expected to be disseminated by 
the public media and which related to the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused, the evidence or the merits of the 
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case, or which were reasonably likely to interfere with a 
free trial. Appellant attacks those findings and attempts 
to re-argue the underlying facts before this Court, 
including the credibility of certain witnesses. 
As set forth in Point I, above, the findings of 
the Commission are entitled to a presumption of correct-
ness and the evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the Bar, the prevailing party below. Appellant 
may not simply urge his version of the facts upon this Court, 
when the Commission has rejected that version, in the absence 
of a persuasive showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness 
or a disregard of the preponderance of the evidence. 
Appellant has failed to make the necessary showing. 
There was no dispute in the evidence that Appellant 
made the statement, as broadcast, to Mr. Horton, whom 
Appellant knew to be a reporter (T.372, 374). The issue 
centered on the circumstances surrounding the interview 
and whether Appellant should have reasonably expected 
the statement to be broadcast. 
The Commission obviously decided to believe the 
version of Mr. Horton, an unbiased witness, over that of 
Appellant. The hearing panel was in a singular position 
to observe the witnesses and rule on their credibility. 
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Nonetheless, Appellant would ask this Court to reject the 
testimony of Mr. Horton and devotes pages of his Brief 
to an apparent impeachment of the witness' observation or 
recollection of the facts. He chooses to ignore a similar 
impeachment concerning his own addition of new testimony at 
the hearing. (T.426, 427). 
In any event, the evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Bar, clearly supports the 
findings of the Commission. Mr. Horton interviewed 
Appellant at counsel table concerning the jury background 
investigation. (T.131, 132). The reporter was taking 
notes. (T.133). As part of the interview Mr. Horton 
asked Appellant for his prediction, based on the information 
received from the investigation, as to the outcome of the 
trial. (T.133). Mr. Horton testified that he did not 
recall prefacing his question with the words ''incidently" 
or "by the way". (T.133, 149, 150). The reporter 
then prepared a news release containing Appellant's 
statement and it was broadcast on the evening news. 
136). 
The Bar also offered extensive expert testimony 
from experienced members of the news media in Salt 
(T.134-
Lake City. (T.90, 162, 183, 201). These experts established 
that the business of the news media is to gather and dis-
seminate information, (T.102, 205, 211-212); that a public 
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official speaks to a reporter at his own peril, absent some 
prior agreement that the communication is confidential, 
(T.95, 106, 166, 188, 207); and that the only way a public 
official can make certain that a statement will not be 
disseminated is to not make it. (T.166, 200, 204). The 
experts further testified in response to a hypothetical 
question, based on facts proven by the Bar that the 
reporter did not violate a c0nfidence in broadcasting the 
statement. (T.96-102, 167-174, 189-192, 205-208). Their 
opinions did not change when the facts of the hypothetical 
were varied by counsel for Appellant. 
193-195, 213-216). 
(T.103-113, 174-182, 
The expert witnesses testified that Mr. Horton 
did not violate any confidence or understanding, even if 
Appellant used the words "incidently" or "by the way," 
or if the interview took place on the way out of the 
building, or if the reporter knew of the judge's concern. 
(Id.) There was testimony that reporters often interview 
public officials while in transit. (T.179). 
The Bar submits that the expert testimony 
was material to the issue of what a reasonable person 
could expect to be disseminated by the media. A reasonable 
expectation is determined by the general practice in the 
community and that practice is established by the media. The 
only way a public official can control dissemination is to 
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keep quiet and thereby eliminate the source. Once he 
speaks, he is at the mercy of the newsman. Of course, the 
newsman may agree in advance to keep it "off the record". 
If not, however, the statement may be broadcast if it is deemed 
newsworthy. Any expectation to the contrary by Appellant, or 
any other person, would be patently unreasonable. 
Appellant also relies heavily on the "Statement 
of Principles and Guidelines for Reporting", (Ex. 33), 
as establishing a joint responsibility for not disseminating 
such a statement. Appellant was aware of the guideline 
contained in paragraph 33 of the Statement of Principles at 
the time he was interviewed. (T.406). Mr. Horton was 
not. (T.152, 154). 
Assuming arquendo, that Mr. Horton was profes-
sionally and ethically bound by the guideline and, assuming 
further, that he breached that duty by broadcasting the 
statement, Appellant's conduct would still not be excused. 
The guidelines purport to impose a dual responsibility upon 
the bar and the media. This responsibility is in addition 
to the duties imposed on the bar by DR 7-107(B) (6) and 
DR 7-107(D). Appellant may not justify his breach of those 
responsibilities by claiming that he reasonably expected 
that the reporter would not violate them as well. It may 
be that they both violated their respective duties, however, 
the latter does not abs0lve the former. The Rules of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
Discipline were meant to be obeyed by the Bar. We may not 
shift our obligation to others. 
All of the arguments put forth by Appellant to 
show that Mr. Horton should have known not to broadcast 
the statement apply with greater force to Appellant's 
making the statement in the first place. If Mr. Horton 
should have known of the concerns of the judge and defense 
counsel and of the fact that dissemination of such a state-
ment might prejudice the jury, Appellant was in an even 
better position to know these things. Appellant testified 
that he did know of these concerns. (T.429). Appellant 
also knew that the statement should never have been broad-
cast. (T.431). He should have known equally that the 
statement should never have been made. 
There was no reason for Appellant to have made 
the statement in the first place. He did not know Mr. 
Horton nor did he have a special relationship with him. 
(T.372). Mr. Horton had no pressing reason to know Appellan: 
prediction of the outcome of the trial. The Rules of 
Discipline and the Ethical Considerations impose a clear 
duty on an attorney in these circumstances. That duty 
is to remain silent. There are ample facts in evidence 
to support the Bar Commission's findings and recommenda-
tion on this charge and they should be sustained by this 
Court. 
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POINT IV. CC:UNT TWO. THE EMARINE MATTER. THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS. APPELLANT DID Nor 
MAINTAIN Ca.!PLETE AND ADEQUATE RECORDS AND 
DID Nor MAINTAIN THE FUNDS IN A SEPARATE TRUST 
ACCC:UNT. THE MITIGATION CLAIMED BY APPELLANT 
WAS GIVEN DUE REGARD. 
Appellant undertook to perform legal services for 
Winona Emarine in the collection of child support payments 
due from her former husband, Berry Belcher. (T39, 40). 
Belcher had checks, generally, in the sum of $65.00 each 
(Ex. 30), made payable to Winona Emarine or Winona Tucher 
(her former name) and deposited with the Clerk of the Court. 
(T40). Appellant either picked up the checks or had the 
Clerk mail them to him. Pursuant to a power of attorney (T40), 
Appellant then indorsed the checks and caused them to be 
deposited to his account (Ex. 30). 
For a period of time, Mrs. Emarine received disbursements 
from Appellant. However, from July of 1970 until December of 
1974, she heard nothing from him, at which time, the failure 
of Appellant to disburse surfaced. Appellant sent Mrs. Emarine 
an affidavit (Ex. 12) based on the records of the Clerk of the 
Court which indicated some child support payments had been made 
during the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 but not fully disbursed 
to her. She requested an explanation (Ex. 11) (T41, 42, 43). 
Again, by letter dated February 2, 1975, she asked who received 
the money because she hadn't (Ex. 13) (T44) . 
She contacted the Appellant personally by phone in the 
summer of 1975 and was told he had been too busy to check his 
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records (T46). After she made several attempts to get the 
matter settled and received no cooperation from Appellant, 
she hired an attorney to help her (T47, 49). 
Her attorney then contacted Appellant and requested 
accountings and funds by letters dated August 2, 1975 (Ex. 1 
August 21, 1975 (Ex. 17) and August 27, 1975 (Ex. 19). 
Appellant did not make an accounting and action was filed 
against him in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake county, State of Utah in 
October of 1976 (Ex. 27). 
In his brief Appellant admits he failed to account. ll 
is noted that it was only just prior to the Bar Commission 
hearing that Appellant finally hired his former secretary 
and an accountant for the purpose of analyzing his records. 
It was apparent that the child support payments made by 
Belcher during the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 were 
received by Appellant and deposited in his bank accounts. 
However, he failed to promptly notify Mrs. Emarine as to 
the receipt of these funds (T41) 
It was only after the intervention of counsel that th~ 
matter got settled. other than two small payments (T48), 
Appellant refused to pay over sums due until Mrs. Emarine 
exhibited to Appellant the original of Belcher's cancelled 
child support checks showing that they were indeed made and 
were deposited in Appellant's bank accounts and cleared the 
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bank (TSO). (Mrs. Emarine obtained these checks from Mr. 
Belcher and his widow in a piecemeal fashion). Then and 
only then did Appellant disburse. 
Even under these circumstances, Appellant, while 
paying interest, insisted on deducting his fee (TSO, Sl, 409). 
Appellant paid $449.28 on September 4, 197S, after 
production of some of Belcher's checks. Appellant deposited 
a check for $128S.00 with the Clerk of the Court on September 27, 
1976, which was paid on January 10, 1977, after production of 
some more of Belcher's checks. Appellant paid $599.00 by 
check (TS6) on February 23, 1977, after the production of 
the rest of Belcher's checks (Ex. 31). 
At the hearing, Appellant admitted he failed to maintain 
all funds collected in a separate account and commingled the 
same with his own funds (T416). This is also admitted in his 
brief. Further, Appellant stated that he closed out his trust 
account and utilized the trust funds that.were in that account 
for his own purposes (T416). 
Appellant argues that he is entitled to an unequivocal 
finding, that he maintained complete and adequate records. 
On the other hand, he could not determine what checks had 
cleared the bank, nor could he render an accounting therefrom. 
He admitted the weakness in his record keeping system was the 
failure to keep a check register (T414). He stated he was 
concerned that the Belcher checks were bouncing. He admitted 
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that any such checks would have been mailed back to him, 
but hecnuldn't remember if they were. His records were 
i11adequate to assure prompt and proper disbursement of 
clients' funds. 
The evidence supports the findings that: 
Appellant undertook to perform legal services for one 
Winona Emarine in the collection of child support, and he 
collected funds for his client; 
Appellant failed to notify his client of the receipt 
of the said funds; 
Appellant failed to render an appropriate accounting 
of funds collected to his client; 
Appellant failed to maintain complete and adequate 
records of the funds which he collected; 
Appellant failed to pay the funds over to his client 
promptly as they were received, or when requested to do so 
by his client; 
That the foregoing conduct constituted violations of 
the provisions of Rule IV, Canon 9 DR 9-102 (B) (1), (3) 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar; 
That the said acts did constitute a violation of the 
provisions of Section 78-51-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
As Amended; 
That Appellant failed to maintain the funds collected 
in a separate trust account and commingled the same with hi' 
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own funds; 
That said acts violated the provisions of Rule IV, 
Canon 9 DR 9-102 (A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
of the Utah State Bar. 
It is apparent the Bar Commission took into account 
matters of so-called mitigation. If any of the violations 
had been found to be the result of willful and deliberate 
misconduct, the Appellant should receive a harsher penalty 
and the Commission would have so recommended. 
The Commission exercised restraint and gave the 
Appellant every benefit of matters in mitigation in recommend-
ing a suspension of only one year. 
POINT V. COONT ONE OF THE CCT>l.PIAINT: THE L<l1RY MATTER. THE 
FINDINGS ARE ACCURATE, FAIR, AND IN EACH INSTANCE, 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE MITIGATION CLAIMED 
BY APPELLANT WAS GIVEN DUE REGARD. 
The Appellant has raised three "technical defenses" to 
Count One. He claims that no attorney-client relationship 
existed betweenh]m and the complaintants. 
In 1963, the Appellant initiated legal action against 
Allen B. Gardner and Leslie L .. Boothe, naming Frankli~ Life 
Insurance company as the plaintiff (T-269). The Appellant 
thereafter between 1965 and 1970, periodically collected 
amounts on the Boothe Suit. (T-272) In 1966 he began 
remitting the sums collected directly to Mrs. Lowry. (T-273) 
When asked if he didn't know and believe that Mr. Lc:llNry, and 
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subsequently his widow, were the real parties in interest 
in Lhat suit, he stcited: "I must have thought thcit, yes." 
(T-275) 
The Appellant claims a three year statute of limitatior,, 
as his second "technical defense". He alleges that the 
last activity on the Lowry matter occurred in 1966. This io 
obviously incorrect since he admits collections in 1970. 
(T-275) The real issue, however, are the allegations contair., 
in the Complaint, to-wit: his neglect and failure to proper'. 
account for the funds collected. These acts of omission 
continued up to and past the filing of the Complaint with t~ 
Bar. The Appellant admits he did not even attempt to make a 
final accounting until July of 1976. (T-281) 
Appellant claims as his third "technical defense" that 
his acts did not constitute neglect as defined in the Amer~! 
Bar Association informal opinion No. 1273. The evidence on 
this point is overwhelmingly to the contrary, as discussed fo 
greater detail hereinafter. 
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to 
notify his clients of the receipt of funds within a reasonab: 
time. The evidence shows that on at least twelve separate 
occasions between O:::tober 30, 1968 and May 14, 1970, he 
received payments on the Boothe suit and made no remittance 
to anyone until after the Complaint was filed with the Bar 
Association in 1976. (T-276) It would be bizarre to cl0in' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-19-
this was done within a reasonable time. 
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to maintain 
complete and adequate records of the funds which he collected. 
The evidence supports this finding. Exhibit 46 is Appellant's 
purported accounting of money received on the Boothe suit. 
Appellant admits that this was prepared after he met with the 
screening committee and at their suggestion, (T-286), and was 
compiled from his receipt books. At the hearing before the 
Commission, it was pointed out to the Appellant that in 
September of 1965 he filed a garnishee judgment and execution 
on the Boothe suit and obtained $68.11 from First Security 
Bank. {T-284) He admitted he could find no accounting 
to show what happened to those funds. (T-284) 
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to render 
an appropriate or sufficient accounting to his clients. The 
evidence shows that after the Complaint was filed, the 
Appellant submitted a check to Mrs. Lowry for $162.72 with 
nothing more than an allegation that it was the balance due 
her of the $449. 08 collected. {Exhibit 7 and T-283) This 
could not be construed to be an appropriate or sufficient 
accounting. 
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to promptly 
pay said funds to his clients as they were received or when 
requested to do so by his clients. The evidence showing lack 
of prompt payment has previously been discussed. The evidence 
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further shows that repeated requests were made by Mrs. Low~ 
and others to the Appellant to provide some accounting. Mrs. 
Lowry wrote a letter May 6, 1968, (Exhibit 1), requesting an 
accounting. No response was ever given. (T-20) Another 
request was made by registered mail dated March 4, 1971, 
(Exhibit 4), with no response. (T-21) During this period o; 
time, Mrs. Lowry asked her son Jim to assist her in getting 
the matter turned over to another lawyer so the matter could: 
given better attention. (T-21) Jim Lowry made this request 
directly to Mr. Hansen at his office. (T-35) The Appellant' 
response was made on a check stub he sent her, (Exhibit 2), 
stating he would retain and finish the suit and have a progr2• 
report by April 15th. (T-22) No report was ever furnished. 
A third letter was mailed February 10, 1972, together with 
Mrs. Lowry's own records of the checks she had received and 
requesting an accounting. (T-23) None was gi•,ren. (T-23) CT 
of these letters was found by the Appellant shortly before hL 
hearing, unopened. (T-278) Additionally, Mrs. Lawry's son:.I 
made many phone requests of Mr. Hansen for an accounting, nor .• 
of which were ever honored. (T - 3 6 and 3 7 ) 
The Findings state that the Appellant failed to maintai~. 
the funds collected in a separate trust account and comming~­
the same with his own funds. The Appellant admits that when 
he went to work full-time for the Attorney General he assume: 
the money remaining in the trust account was his own and dr• 
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the money out and used the same. (T-~92) The Canons require 
that funds belonging to a client be deposited in a trust 
account and left there until all disputes with a client are 
resolved. It is incomprehensible that the Appellant 
believed all of those funds remaining in his trust account 
were his when he had been receiving repeated requests from the 
Lowrys for an accounting and had failed to keep a proper 
accounting himself. 
The Findings state that the Appellant did not complete 
the legal services which he undertook for his clients in a 
timely manner, that he neglected the matter, and that he failed 
and refused to reasonably or adequately communicate with his 
clients or their subsequently engaged counsel. 
The lawsuit initiated against Allen Gardner in 1963 was 
for the principal sum of $2,919.31. Allen Gardner and Leslie 
Boothe were agents for Franklin Life Insurance Company. (T-17) 
J. E. Lowry was the regional manager, (T-16), and in that 
capacity was responsible for overdraws of his agents. Both 
Gardner and Boothe drew advances against unearned commissions. 
Their deficit became the responsibility of Mr, Lowry and for 
that reason when sums were collected they were paid to him and 
then his widow after his death in 1964. 
As Mrs. Lowry received money on the Boothe account, she 
would deduct it from the balance due from Gardner. (T-24) In 
February of 1976 she believed there was still $1,054.21 due 
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her on the Gardner account. (T-24) 
The Appellant admits that after 1964 he received no 
money on the Gardner account. (T-284) He also admits that 
other than some minor things that do not appear in the Court 
file, (Exhibit 8), or by any other documentation, he made 
virtually no collection efforts on this account after 1964. 
(T-285) Allen Gardner died in 1975, leaving no apparent est:: 
and thus totally preventing any further collections for Mrs. 
Lowry. An eleven year old file with no action despite repeat 
requests from the Lowrys and subsequently ending by the deat'. 
of the defendant must be considered neglect within the defim· 
tion of the Canons. 
Appellant further argues that since there was an 
absence of fraudulent or evil intent, the discipline imposed 
should be mitigated. It is submitted that if fraudulent 
or evil intent had been present, the Bar Commission would ha" 
been justified in recommending disbarment. Obviously, by on'. 
recommending a one year suspension, the Bar Commission has 
considered all of the mitigating circumstances to which the 
Appellant claims he is entitled. 
POINT VI. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS Nor IMMUNE FRC11 DISCIPLic~ 
PROCEEDINGS BY THE UTAH STATE BAR BY VIRTUE OF HIS 
OFFICE. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys and 
counselors of the Utah State Bar are binding upon all its 
members. See Rule I. Appe lla;1t cannot insulate himself 
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from the application of these rules by being elected to the 
Office of Attorney General or by being Attorney General. 
Appellant asserts the Commission is without authority 
to suspend him since such action would be tantamount 
to removing him from office. The purpose of these proceedings 
is not removal from office, but inquiry into fitness to 
practice law and determination of whether there should be a 
suspension. 
Section 19, Article VI of the Utah Constitution provides 
for impeachment of state officers for high crimes, misdemeanors 
or malfeasance in office. The conduct complained of in these 
proceedings may or may not constitute grounds for impeachment, 
however, to remove Appellant by this method would require a 
trial before the Senate with proof of commission of high crimes, 
misdemeanors or malfeasance in office. 
Appellant claims that the Utah Constitution and statutues 
presume that the Attorney General shall practice law in his 
official capacity. The Utah Constitution at Section 3 of 
Article VII provides: 
"No person shall be eligible to the office of ••• 
Attorney General unless he shall have ••. been 
admitted to the practice in the Supreme Court of 
the ... State of Utah, nor unless he shall be in 
good standing at the bar at the time of his election." 
The matter of whether the Attorney General must maintain 
his license to practice law in order to retain office is not 
the subject matter of this proceeding. It could be decided in 
..J 
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another proceeding such as one brought under Rule 65Il(b) (1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (quo warranto). 
Appellant asserts that performance of statutory duties 
requires the handling of conflict of interest matters, and 
therefore, the Rules of Conduct do not apply to him. If, 
because of the statutes, there is an exception to the applico· 
tion of the rules regarding conflict of interest, it does nat 
logically follow that there is exception as to all the rules. 
Appellant argues the Court has no authority to 
suspend him, yet seems to concede the power of the Court to 
reprimand him. It would seem that the Court either has the 
power to discipline the Appellant or that it does not. The 
middle ground apparently urged by Appellant does not appear 
to be logical. 
The cases of Simpson v Alabama State Bar 311 So.2d 307 
and Watson v Alabama, 311 So.2d 311, cited by Appellant state 
the law in Alabama, prior to the adoption of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. The Court in Simpson specifically 
stated that "The question of whether or not a district 
attorney may be disciplined for violation of this Code of 
Professional Responsibility is not before us." (P. 310) 
Only one Utah case could be located which deals direct!,. 
the problem. This is the case of In re Burton, 246 P 188, 
which involved a state district court judge. In the Burton 
case, disciplinary proceedings charged the judge with two 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-25-
counts of misconduct while he was a judge and two related 
to his conduct prior to becoming a judge while he was a 
county attorney. It was argued that because a judge is 
forbidden from practicing law and because the state con-
stitution provides for impeachment proceedings for judicial 
misconduct, that impeachment is the exclusive remedy, and 
the Utah Supreme Court has no power to disbar judges. The 
court noted that: 
... there is good authority to sustain the 
proposition that, if sufficient cause exists 
therefore, an attorney at law may be disciplined 
or disbarred and his license to practice law 
cancelled and revoked, though he holds or occupies 
a judicial or other official position, or is not 
for other reasons engaged in the practice, and 
though further committed offenses or wrongs. 
246 P. at 198-199. 
The court went on to adamantly assert its power over all 
members of the bar, no matter what their official positions. 
It may as well be said that we cannot deal with 
an attorney and counselor at law as a member of 
the bar of this court, if holding a judicial or 
other public or official position, if the wrongs 
and conduct committed render him subject to 
indictment, or at least until he is convicted, as 
to say that we may not deal with him for wrongs 
and conduct rendering him subject to impeachment, 
or at least not until he is removed. from office. 
It is generally held that misconduct from an 
attorney, even outside of his professional 
dealings as such, may be sufficient to justify his 
discipline or disbarment ... and this court is 
committed to the doctrine that an attorney, as 
a member of this court, may be disciplined and 
disbarred though the acts and conduct are not direct-
ly connected with his practice, if they show 
such a lack of honesty, integrity, and fidelity 
as to indicate that he is an unfit and improper 
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person to be entrusted with the powers and clutie:c 
of an attorney ... This court is further com-
mited to the doctrine that its power to deal with 
its own officers, including attorneys, is inherent 
continui.ng, and plenary, and exists independ<"ntl~·· 
of statute and ought to be assumed and exercised 
as the exigencies and necessities of the case 
require ... and that courts having power to admit 
attorneys to the bar, also possess, as a 
necessary and inherent incident of such power the 
right to disbar them for unworthy behavior, un-
professional conduct, or moral turpitude, or moral 
unfitness independently of authority given by 
statute. 246 P. at 199-200. 
The court did acknowledge that their power in such instances 
went only to the status as attorney, and had no direct ef~~ 
on the official position of the accused attorney, judicial 
or otherwise. 
The position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Burton case is identical to that taken by most other 
state supreme courts. The Kansas Supreme court disagreed 
with the position that an accused attorney who is also a 
judge can be subject to disbarment as an attorney only after 
forfeiture of that office. " •. it is the law of the land 
established by the great weight of authority, than an 
attorney possessing a license to practice law and holding a 
judicial position, such as is now occupied by the accused, 
is subject to disbarment in the proceedings of the characte! 
here involved." In re Stice, 184 Kansas 589, 339 P.2d. 
29, 32 (1959). The court went on to cite supportive cases 
from the states of Ohio, Nebraska, Arizona, Connecticut, 
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Illinois, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Dakota, Washington, 
~isconsin, and Colorado. See also, In re Watson, 286 
P.2d 254 (Nevada, 1966), and State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar 
Association v. James, 463 P.2d 972 (Oklahoma, 1969). 
It appears to be obvious that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar as approved by the Supreme 
Court are intended to apply to an attorney who occupies 
the office of attorney general as well as to all other 
members of the Bar. This is notwithstanding the fact 
that Utah has impeachment and removal procedures prescribed 
by the constitution and by statute. 
CONCLUSION 
As to the Emarine and Lowry matters, Appellant does not 
seem to object to the findings that there was a failure of 
notification of the receipt of funds, failure to render an 
appropriate accounting and failure to pay the funds over. 
It is also noted Appellant admits there was a failure to 
maintain all funds collected in a separate trust account. 
Appellant argues that the Bar should have found that he main-
tained complete and adequate records. However, if this were 
the case, he would have been able to render an accounting 
when requested. Whatever records he did maintain were 
insufficient for this purpose. 
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a finding that he 
cl id not comm:i ng le funds . The evidence is contrary. Furthermore, 
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Appellant admitted he closed out his trust account at a tim~ 
~hen clients funds had not been disbursed. 
Appellant complains that the findings should contain 
mitigating circumstances. Yet matters in mitigation were 
obviously considered by the Commission. If these acts of 
misconduct of Appellant were found to have been committed 
wilfully and deliberately, a harsher penalty, perhaps dis-
barment, would have been recommended. 
In the Dick matter, Appellant is entitled to no more 
than an Order dismissing that Complaint. See Rule III of 
the Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. 
In the Piepenburg matter, the evidence was sufficient t: · 
support the findings. 
The findings of the Bar should be affirmed and the 
recommendation that Appellant be suspended from the practice 
of law for one year should be adopted. 
DATED this 31st day of May, 1978. 
/) . 
Respec~fully subm 
~r~\ 
~-.</t:c/ -
Lavar E. 
(~sill 
-,,\._ '~~ 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar Corr-
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